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149 
The United States at the End of the “American 
Century”: The Rule of Law or Enlightened 
Absolutism?* 
Gerhard Casper 
I 
My former colleague and friend, the late Edward Shils, once 
wrote that he never wanted to be against his fellow countrymen or to 
be a Cassandra—it was much too easy to make dark prophecies.1 
However, he went on to say that his outlook on society became more 
somber over time.2 It is much too easy to make dark prophecies, 
indeed. I emigrated to the United States in 1964.  Over these decades 
our country, in a myriad of ways, has become a better place than it 
was at that time. However, today is not the Fourth of July and we, 
especially the lawyers among us, have many reasons to be somber. I 
would like to talk about a few of them. I shall do this because there 
are grounds aplenty to attempt to do better. 
Let me begin by defining the four reference points of the question 
that is my title—“The United States at the End of the ‘American 
Century’: The Rule of Law or Enlightened Absolutism?” First, a few 
observations about “the United States.” While today is not the Fourth 
of July, it is nevertheless appropriate to invoke Abraham Lincoln’s 
explication of the meaning of Independence Day when referring to 
the United States. In 1858, in his senatorial campaign against Stephen 
A. Douglas, Lincoln estimated that about half of the United States 
population had its origins not in Great Britain, but rather that they or 
their ancestors came from “Europe”—he referred to the Germans, 
 
 * President and Professor of Law, Stanford University. The following Article is based 
on a presentation delivered by President Casper in the Public Interest Law Speakers Series as 
the Tyrrell Williams Lecture at Washington University School of Law on January 31, 2000. A 
slightly different version of this lecture was delivered at the University of San Diego in 1999. 
 1. EDWARD SHILS, T HE VIRTUE OF CIVILITY  21 (Steven Grosby ed., 1997). 
 2. Id.  
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Irish, French, and Scandinavians.3 To “loud and long continued 
applause” he stated that the Declaration of Independence and its self-
evident truth of equal creation gave them “a right to claim it as 
though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh of the men 
who wrote that Declaration.”4 
Earlier, Lincoln referred to the fact that the United States had 
become “a mighty nation” with a population of about thirty million.5 
Less than a century and a half later, the head count is 274 million. 
Twenty-four percent of the present population of California is 
foreign-born.6 If we add to that percentage those born in the United 
States to immigrant mothers, one-third of the state’s population has 
intimate links to other countries and cultures.7 Since I moved to the 
United States from Germany thirty-six years ago, profound political 
changes have taken place. One might say that, over these decades, the 
hegemony of White Anglo-Saxon Protestantism has almost 
disappeared. I remind you that as recently as the election campaign of 
1960, the fact that John F. Kennedy was a Roman Catholic was a 
matter of considerable controversy—something that is much harder 
to imagine today. 
There can be little doubt that the country’s culture has become 
more diverse and, in some areas, more contentious, even as the great 
legal documents of 1776 and 1787 remain the common denominator 
that makes us one society. It is a cliché that the United States is a 
young country. A few years ago, my former teacher, Charles Black of 
the Yale Law School, pointed out that just three human lives, not 
phenomenally long, can more or less cover the period from the 
Revolution to the present day. He chose the slightly overlapping lives 
of three former presidents: James Madison, Benjamin Harrison, and 
Dwight Eisenhower.8 While obviously you could make a similar 
calculation for any country, there is no country in the world, and I 
 
 3. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, Illinois, in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 1832-
1858 (1989).  
 4. Id. at 456. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Ramon G. McLeod, Immigration Top Factor in ‘90s Growth , S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 
1999, at A2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Charles L. Black, Jr., And Our Posterity, 102 YALE L.J. 1527, 1527 (1993). 
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include Britain in this comparison, where those three lives would 
cover as much apparent constitutional and institutional continuity. 
By contrast, for instance with France and Germany, our 213 years 
of the world’s oldest written constitution represent an extraordinary 
constitutionalist accomplishment. Furthermore, can you name any 
other society where politicians of the late eighteenth century daily are 
looked to for guidance on present-day political issues? As I make 
these claims of continuity, it goes without saying that there also have 
been profound constitutional discontinuities, adaptations and 
changes. Indeed, many of the legal disputes of recent decades are due 
to our efforts to deal with the tensions of a large, multi-racial, multi-
ethnic society within an eighteenth century republican, democratic, 
federal constitutional structure that, but for the Civil War 
Amendments, remains formally unchanged. 
My second reference point, the “end of the American century,” 
obviously is my escape from the ceaseless talk about the twenty-first 
century, the bridge thereto, and the never-ending invocations of the 
third millennium. I chose the end of the present century (I count the 
year 2000 as its last year) because we can actually make verifiable 
statements about it. 
The British historian Eric Hobsbawm has called his book on the 
twentieth century The Age of Extremes.9 He also considers the 
twentieth century the “short” century and dates it from 1914 to 
1991.10 Centuries and millennia are, of course, wholly arbitrary 
fictions of calendar makers and the fin de siècle  is as unreal as the 
notion that we need a “bridge” to the twenty-first century. Having 
said that, it is convenient to divide up the past. Politically, this has 
been the century of the first World War, the Russian Revolution, the 
Stalinist evils, the horrors perpetrated by Nazi Germany and the 
second World War that was followed by the third, “cold” world war. 
The second half of this century saw decolonization, Mao and the 
emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a major player, as 
well as the increasing significance of the global economy with Japan 
and other Asian countries playing key roles. In the second half of the 
 
 9. E.J. HOBSBAWM, T HE AGE OF EXTREMES: THE SHORT TWENTIETH CENTURY 1914-91 
(1994). 
 10. Id.  
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twentieth century, Western European nations joined together in ways 
that are breathtaking if seen against the history of the outgoing 
millennium. Finally, the Soviet Union and its dominance over Central 
and Eastern Europe fell with the Berlin Wall. 
During all of this, the United States increased its power and 
influence while also undergoing significant internal evolutions, most 
importantly the extension of civil rights protection. The United States 
saw many aspects of the “American way of life,” both cultural and 
material, embraced abroad. To a large extent, the twentieth century 
has been the “American century.” Our economic system has served, 
and continues to serve, as a model even if its adoption is often highly 
qualified. We can now see what only twenty years ago would have 
been less clear: The most influential economist of the century has 
probably been the American Milton Friedman. 
I am not an economist by profession, but a lawyer. How satisfied 
should we be with the accomplishments of our legal system? Is the 
United States’ legal system something we should want to export? 
Thus, I now turn to the third component of my title, “the rule of law.” 
In the United States, that concept has been primarily the domain 
of bar associations and political rhetoric. It rarely is invoked by 
courts as a rule of decision. At present, the rule of law is often 
bandied about as identifying what is missing in many countries, such 
as China, without anybody bothering much about institutional details. 
The concept of the rule of law has venerable origins and, as far as 
Anglo-American legal traditions are concerned, it gained lasting 
prominence in the Magna Carta. In the American context, Thomas 
Paine contrasted it succinctly with absolutism. In America, he wrote, 
the law is king.11 “For as in absolute Governments the King is Law, 
so in free countries the Law ought to be King; and there ought to be 
no other.”12 
But what is the substance of this rule of law? A complicated 
question since the concept seems to be a fairly empty vessel whose 
contents, depending on the speaker, can differ even more than the 
various approaches to constitutional interpretation. However, I think 
 
 11. Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in 1 T HE POLITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS WORKS OF 
T HOMAS PAINE 32 (1819). 
 12. Id.  
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the rule of law can be understood as including, at a minimum, the 
requirement of a clear basis in law for the exercise of public 
authority, the protection of individual rights, including safeguards 
against the abuse of power, an independent judiciary and equality 
before the law. Of course, none of these components is self-defining, 
but they can serve as reference points. 
Finally, in the fourth part of my title, what do I mean by 
“enlightened absolutism?” Instead of an abstract definition, let me 
invoke the late eighteenth century example of the General Code for 
the Prussian States, a product of the enlightened absolutism of 
Frederick II who desired a natural law, reason-based codification 
administered by a civil service so that the messy phenomena of life 
could be made to fit the Code.13 The final result was a comprehensive 
effort to clearly define the subject’s rights (and, of course, 
obligations) in all stations of life, public and private, from the cradle 
to the grave. 
The Prussian Code included a title headed “of the rights and 
Duties of the State in general.”14 It postulated that these rights and 
duties were united in the monarch, who maintained external and 
internal peace and security, but who also protected the individual in 
“his own.”15 It was the state’s task to provide the inhabitants with the 
means and opportunity to develop their abilities and strengths so that 
they might apply those skills to further their fortunes. This potentially 
far-reaching conception of the state led to the creation of a cadre of 
administrators subject to “general norms and prescribed procedures 
and committed to impersonal efficiency.”16 
The Prussian Code contained the astounding number of over 
17,000 articles covering public and private law. Frederick himself 
thought it was much too long. It contained, of course, provisions 
about marriage and even detailed when partners were excused from 
the performance of their marital duties (for instance, when away on 
 
 13. MACK WALKER, GERMAN HOME T OWNS: COMMUNITY , STATE, AND GENERAL 
ESTATE 1648-1871, 160 (1971). 
 14. ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE PREUßISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794 (Dr. Hans 
Hattenhauer ed., 1970) [hereinafter PRUSSIAN CODE]. 
 15. Eg., id. 
 16. HANS ROSENBERG , BUREAUCRACY ,  ARISTOCRACY , AND AUTOCRACY :  THE 
PRUSSIAN EXPERIENCE 1660-1815, 48 (1966). 
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government business). Even more comprehensive detail could be 
found in the 104 provisions dealing with the legal consequences of 
extra-marital intercourse, and others that dealt with sexual 
harassment of household employees. The Prussian Code was 
draconian in dealing with malfeasance in office, prescribing, for 
example, removal from office and two to five years of incarceration 
for judicial officers who, in violating their duties, were motivated by 
“animosity, private passions or other ulterior purposes.”17 
The comprehensiveness of this regulatory effort should not seem 
overly foreign to us, for the Prussian Code does find a counterpart in 
the American legal system at fin de siècle , as we, too, try to make the 
messy phenomena of life fit the law. Indeed, Prussia pales by 
comparison when it comes to the all-encompassing breadth and depth 
that reaches the picayune; and it keeps getting worse. The Federal 
Register, a daily report of new and proposed regulations, increased 
from 15,000 pages in the final year of John F. Kennedy’s presidency 
to over 72,000 pages in 1998.18 That is about 200 pages a day, 
including weekends. 
Beginning with President Carter and continuing with Presidents 
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, winning presidential candidates have run 
on platforms complaining about big government and have been 
ostensibly committed to deregulation. The results are mostly pitiful. 
Furthermore, the Prussian Code had one advantage over any laws and 
regulations passed in the United States in the last few decades: The 
language in which it was written had an immediate, vivid quality and 
resembled daily life. What our system produces is mostly 
incomprehensible to everyone, including lawyers. 
I am going to spare you a litany of contemporary regulatory 
excesses and absurdities. Philip K. Howard did a good job of that in 
his 1994 book The Death of Common Sense—How Law is Suffocating 
America.19 I will, however, give you just two up-to-date illustrations 
of latter day enlightened absolutism. The City of San Francisco, one 
 
 17. PRUSSIAN CODE, supra  note 14. 
 18. See PHILIP K. HOWARD , T HE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE  25 (1994). See, e.g., Agency 
Responsibilities, Organization, and Terminology for the Department of Agriculture, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 72,352 (1998). 
 19. HOWARD , supra  note 18. 
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of the American jurisdictions that think of themselves as enlightened, 
has required private contractors doing business with the city to 
disclose the distribution of sexual preferences among its employees.20 
Health Commission Policy number twenty-four stated, in captivating 
English, that a “contractor’s ethnicity, gender identification, and 
sexual orientation composition is to be representative of the clients 
served.”21 The commission canceled a contract with the Catholic 
Youth Organization, which ran mental health services for troubled 
children, because the group would not comply with the disclosure 
policy.22 This is an example of enlightened absolutism because of its 
intrusiveness and mindless overreach in the service of a cause. After 
the archdiocese threatened legal action, the disclosure provision was 
replaced with one requiring “compliance with anti-discrimination 
protections” and—run for cover—“cultural competence.”23 
The second example is the Department of Labor’s recent 
breathtaking proposal to extend the reach of workplace health and 
safety regulations into the homes of telecommuters. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had not 
received a single complaint from home office workers at the time it 
posted its advisory letter, which has since been withdrawn. We are 
now going to have a “national dialogue” on the matter.24 The 
dialogue will undoubtedly be followed by some form of government 
regulation. In the interest of comprehensiveness we regulate even if 
there is no discernible problem or if the costs to other important 
values outweigh the regulatory gain. The great twentieth century 
writer Robert Musil once said: “Ideals have curious properties, and 
one of them is that they turn into their opposites when one tries to 
live up to them.”25 
 
 20. Sabin Russell, S.F. Braces for Possible Lawsuit by Archdiocese, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 
1999, at A17. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. HEALTH COMMISSION, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, RES. 9-99, AMENDING 
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH ’S POLICY DIRECTIVE #24, ETHNICITY AND GENDER OF 
STAFF AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS; AND RENAMING THE POLICY TO :  CONTRACTORS’ 
COMPLIANCE WITH ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS AND CULTURAL COMPETENCY (1999). 
 24. Sarah Lueck, Home Workers Didn’t File Any OSHA Protests, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 
2000, at A6. 
 25. ROBERT MUSIL, T HE MAN WITHOUT QUALITIES 247 (Eithne Wilkins & Ernst Kaiser, 
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Both episodes illustrate that in the pursuit of “enlightened” 
policies, government does not hesitate to invade the private sphere, 
including, in the San Francisco case, privacy of information and 
associational and religious freedoms. Can a society that 
systematically obliterates the distinction between the public and the 
private realms be free and civilized in the long run? The fact that 
there is much sin does not necessarily mean that we can afford to 
eradicate all of it without turning law enforcement into something 
both oppressive and trivial. Government, the media, other powerful 
commercial interests, the high-tech revolution and many ordinary 
people pay scant attention to the fact that the refusal to recognize any 
line between the public and the private makes all human relations and 
preferences subject to discovery in both the ordinary and legal 
meanings of the word, thus chilling the very privacy and personal 
autonomy that is one of the great accomplishments and results of 
modernity, especially in its American version. 
The pursuit of greater comprehensiveness (itself resulting from 
the “necessity” to deal with lacunae, the number of which increases 
exponentially with regulatory growth) also tends to create a maze in 
which one can all too easily run afoul of the law that is king. The 
greater the maze, the greater the potential that government officials 
implementing syllogistic interpretations of the mandates of 
enlightened government will end up despotic. James Madison 
foresaw this danger, believing that “there are more instances of the 
abridgement of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent 
encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden 
usurpations.”26 Surely one of the most astounding recent news items 
was the effort of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
Attorney General and the FBI Director to mobilize the elderly to 
scrutinize their doctors’ bills for fraud.27 The United States’ 
 
trans., Coward-McCann 1953). 
 26. J. Madison, The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 6, 1788), reprinted in 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 87 
(1836) (Elliot erroneously lists the date of Madison’s address as June 16, 1788). 
 27. See Robert Pear, U.S. Is Asking for Patients’ Help In Fight Against Medicare Fraud, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at A1; Nancy W. Dickey, Government to Grandpa: Rat Out Your 
Doctor, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1999, at A18. 
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government organizes patients, campaign-style, to inform on their 
doctors. I certainly hope that the deputized seniors will succeed in 
figuring out the Medicare regulations. 
II 
How is our legal system coping with the tasks of law enforcement 
in battling the “wars” on various evils that our society has ordained at 
all levels of government: local, regional, state, and federal?  
In what follows, I shall not address tall and large “Rawlsian” 
issues. My question today is not what constitutes a just society, but a 
much more limited examination of some aspects of our performance 
as a legal system, or the rule of law, in a narrower sense. Even so, I 
will choose just a few illustrations from a few areas of the law, some 
ordinary and some remote, to make a larger point: that our 
performance is often mindless and frequently disproportionate and at 
times, even cruel. Achievements in our legal system are no excuse for 
our considerable shortcomings. My primary point is not that “law 
suffocates America” (although, it does), but that our performance, 
under the rule of law, is often lacking. Our performance too often 
displays an insufficient exercise of discretion on the part of 
government actors, and an insufficient examination of the overall 
balance of the costs and benefits entailed in governmental decisions. 
My examples will illustrate what can happen to ordinary people and 
ordinary institutions. 
The first example is taken from a column by Bob Herbert of The 
New York Times.28 It is the story of Ellis Elliot, whose apartment the 
New York police mistakenly invaded and wrecked in search of a drug 
dealer. There was shooting from both sides.29 Before the mistake was 
realized, he was dragged naked into a fourth-floor hallway and his 
hands were cuffed behind his back.30 He was repeatedly addressed as 
“nigger” and “black mother-so-and-so.”31 When he begged for 
clothes, the police first said that, as a mere animal, he did not deserve 
 
 28. Bob Herbert, In America: Day of Humiliation, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at 17. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
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any and then, finally, gave him some of his girlfriend’s clothes to 
wear.32 Dressed in women’s clothing, he was taken out on the street 
in front of a crowd of onlookers.33 At the precinct station, Mr. Elliot’s 
humiliation continued. He was put in a cell and left for several hours, 
in women’s clothing, and with wrists cuffed behind his back for part 
of the time.34 At about 1:00 a.m. the following day when the 
investigators learned of their mistake, they released him.35 Later, Mr. 
Elliot returned to his apartment only to find police officers lounging 
in his living room, eating snacks and watching television.36 Amused, 
one of them suggested that Mr. Elliot find a good lawyer and “sue the 
hell out of them.”37 Is this what we mean by the rule of law? Is this 
what the war on drugs justifies? 
My illustration is not the worst that I could have chosen: Ellis 
Elliot is alive. In the fiscal year of 1998, 2,266 claims of police 
misconduct were filed in New York City,38 continuing disturbing 
trends that led Amnesty International to call for an independent 
inquiry of New York police practices in 1997.39 Unfortunately, New 
York City is not alone. It was only nine years ago that the entire 
world was treated to the video of police violence against Rodney 
King in Los Angeles.40 
Decades ago, Nat Nathanson invoked the adage that the sternest 
test of a civilization is provided by the humaneness of its criminal 
process.41 Since the days of the ancient Greeks, a civilization also has 
been measured by the way in which it deals with foreigners. In 
dispiriting columns over the last three years, Anthony Lewis of The 
New York Times told a number of stories emanating from the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s implementation of the 
 
 32. Id.  
 33. Herbert, supra  note 28. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Joel Berger, The Police Misconduct We Never See, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at A1. 
 39. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 1997 (1997). 
 40. See JEWELLE T AYLOR GIBBS, RACE AND JUSTICE: RODNEY KING AND O.J. SIMPSON 
IN A HOUSE DIVIDED (1996). 
 41. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, 64 CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 131 (1973) 
(reviewing LOIS FORER, NO ONE WILL LISSEN: HOW OUR LEGAL SYSTEM BRUTALIZES THE 
YOUTHFUL POOR (1970)). 
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Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996.42 The Act was signed by the president and enforced by the 
executive branch with mindlessness and cruelty. Some of the 
detention centers and jails used by the INS to hold detainees before 
deportation are so overcrowded that conditions have led to hunger 
strikes.43 The following stories, told by Anthony Lewis, do not 
involve criminals, or even suspects, but rather people like you and 
me. 
John Psaropulous, a British subject and a native of Greece, was a 
television journalist working for CNN. He returned from Athens to 
Atlanta after a vacation. At the airport, he was told that he was 
ineligible to enter because his work visa had expired and the INS had 
not yet acted on CNN’s application for extension.44 Let in 
provisionally, Mr. Psaropulous was eventually arrested, detained, 
and, using the so-called “expedited removal” of aliens procedure, put 
on a plane to Athens with a five-year-ban on returning to the United 
States.45 After things had cleared up, he was issued a new visa by our 
embassy in Athens, and, once again, he arrived in Atlanta and was 
forced back to Greece.46 Authorities then reversed themselves yet 
again and issued Mr. Psaropulous another visa.47 However, “the real 
wrongs” in Mr. Psaropulous’s story are not over: “the wrong of 
vesting in INS bureaucrats unreviewable power to destroy people’s 
lives; the wrong of bureaucrats using their power to punish someone 
because his employer didn’t file a piece of paper; the wrong of 
making people subject to a five-year ban from this country because of 
an innocent mistake.”48 Is this what we mean by the rule of law? I do 
understand, of course, that it is easy for immigration officials to 
become desensitized when for every incident like this there are 
hundreds that involve convicted felons returning again and again. 
 
 42.  8 U.S.C. § 1221,  et seq. (2000). 
 43. Jailed Migrants Hold Hunger Strike, SAN DIEGO UNION & T RIB., Nov. 24, 1998, at 
A3; Andrew Blankstein, Detention Center Locked Down, Hunger Strikers Ill, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
23, 1998, at B2. 
 44. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Is This America?, N.Y. T IMES, Aug. 18, 1997, at 
A19. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
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In another similar story, Martina Thompson, a German citizen, 
married an American and came to the United States on a visitor 
visa.49 As the law allows, Ms. Thompson applied for status 
adjustment as a permanent resident.50 While her application was 
pending, the young couple returned to Germany to visit her parents, 
but before doing so asked the New Orleans office of the INS whether 
she could leave and then subsequently return.51 They were wrongly 
told that she could.52 Shortly after her return to New Orleans, Ms. 
Thompson was arrested and jailed.53 She was thrown into one of the 
most degraded prisons in the country, New Orleans Parish prison.54 
Moreover, Ms. Thompson was held in jail for eight days and her 
husband was not allowed to visit her.55 She was later handcuffed, 
taken to the airport, chained to a seat, and flown back to Germany 
under guard.56 More than a year later, the State Department had 
refused Ms. Thompson’s application for an immigration visa because, 
under the regulations, the State Department required three years of 
business tax returns from her husband, who is in the construction 
business but had been in business for only eighteen months.57 
Fortunately, this story did end happily; after further anguish, the U.S. 
Consulate in Frankfurt issued an immigrant visa to Ms. Thompson 
last winter.58 She reached her new home in Louisiana some time in 
May.59 Is this the rule of law in all its majesty? Is this what the war 
against illegal immigration justifies? 
I now turn to territory well familiar to all of you: the investigation 
that led to the impeachment of President Clinton. Whether President 
Clinton was rightly or wrongly impeached and acquitted is not my 
concern. I am concerned with how others were affected by the events 
 
 49. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: End of a Dream , N.Y. T IMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at 
A23. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Lewis, supra  note 49.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: The Trial, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at A29. 
 58. E-mail from Anthony Lewis, The New York Times, to Robert Hur, Research Assistant 
to President Casper (Oct. 20, 1999) (on file with author).  
 59. Id. 
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that occurred. 
A White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, befriends another 
government employee, Linda Tripp, to whom she confesses, in a 
number of telephone calls, that she is in love with the President and 
has had an affair with him. Ms. Tripp taped these telephone 
conversations without Ms. Lewinsky’s knowledge. Maryland, where 
Ms. Tripp lives, apparently does not permit such tapings.60 Ms. Tripp 
has been indicted on two counts of violating Maryland’s wiretapping 
law and is scheduled to stand trial in July.61 Ms. Tripp surrendered 
copies of the tapes to the lawyers for Paula Jones, who was suing the 
President for sexual harassment. Ms. Tripp also told independent 
counsel Kenneth Starr about her tapes. His office then “wired” her for 
a four-hour meeting with Lewinsky in a Virginia hotel. Virginia law 
apparently permits such wiring.62 
Putting legal issues to one side, we are so ready to shrug our 
shoulders that the rankness of all of these events hardly sinks in 
anymore. Why should we assume it was acceptable for private 
litigators to make use of tapes obtained surreptitiously; to employ an 
old metaphor, “fruit of the poisonous tree?” Without more, how can it 
be acceptable for a government prosecutor to wire a witness in order 
to obtain an extension of his mandate to investigate the President of 
the United States? Under the rule of law, as commonly understood in 
the United States, all of this seems to pass muster. 
In his book on the Lewinsky matter, Judge Posner accurately 
states that evidence obtained in violation of state law is not 
technically “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and therefore, it is 
admissible in federal proceedings.63 He also opines that Starr behaved 
in a manner similar to any responsible independent counsel, stating 
that “[w]here there is smoke, there is usually fire.”64 I disagree with 
Judge Posner’s answer to the question that we so rarely ask these 
 
 60. Michael Gaynor, Why They Barred Wiretaps, LEGAL T IMES, Nov. 9, 1998, at 31. 
 61. Judge Postpones Tripp’s Trial, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 24, 1999, at 3B.  
 62. Daniel H. Pollitt, Essay: Sex in the Oval Office and Cover-Up Under Oath: 
Impeachable Offense? 77 N.C.L. REV. 259, 259-60 n.2 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. 10-402 (Supp. 1997)); VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-62(B)(2) (Michie 1995) (providing an 
exception to wiretapping prohibitions when at least one party consents). 
 63. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE 61 (1999). 
 64. Id. at 70. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p149 Casper.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:149 
 
 
days, which is whether certain practices, even if legal, are good 
practices in a civilized society. 
It is one of the most frequent and greatest conceits encountered in 
present-day legal America to assume that if you can do something 
you should  do it, demonstrating a rather perverse reading of the 
understanding that the United States is a land of unlimited 
possibilities. We have abdicated the delineation of the law’s impact 
on society to the letter of the law and to “anything goes” reasoning by 
lawyers about what we can do, foregoing the use of discretion in 
determining what we should  do. Possibly it is true, as Judge Posner 
writes, that if prosecutors were not so aggressive, “our crime rate 
would be even higher than it is.”65 However, citizens and 
governments must constantly re-evaluate the balance between laxity 
and zeal, because the danger of destroying a desirable society exists 
at both ends of the spectrum. 
Independent counsel staff initially confronted Monica Lewinsky 
on January 16, 1998. It seems to be established that they hindered 
her, or at least discouraged her, from calling her lawyer, and that they 
tried to obtain an immunity agreement by conjuring up the specter of 
long jail sentences and threatening to prosecute her mother.66 In fact, 
the independent counsel’s office did bring Lewinsky’s mother before 
the grand jury, questioning her for over two days. A Time’s article 
states that “[t]hough Starr was operating within the law, not many 
people have seen up close how rough the law can get when a 
determined prosecutor pulls out all the stops.”67 The independent 
counsel even subpoenaed records of Lewinsky’s book purchases from 
Washington bookstores.68 Starr’s spokesman, Charles Bakaly III, said 
of his office’s conduct: “However unpleasant these techniques, they 
are part of what federal prosecutors do.”69 Some commentators agree. 
Judge Posner believes that Starr used “typical hardball prosecutorial 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Sam Skolnik, The Year of the Prosecutor, LEGAL T IMES, Dec. 21, 1998, at 8. 
 67. Richard Lacayo, Turning Up The Heat, T IME , Feb. 23, 1998, at 32. 
 68. Nick Bravin, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments 
Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998); Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: 
Sense of Proportion, N.Y. T IMES, Apr. 20, 1998, at A19. 
 69. Skolnik, supra  note 66. 
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methods”70 that at most could be deemed harmless error.71 Members 
of Starr’s office defended their issuance of subpoenas by pointing to 
precedents in the investigations of Ted Kaczynski and Timothy 
McVeigh: What better example of the lost sense of proportion could 
there be than this comparison of the need to discover the reading lists 
of mass murders and Monica Lewinsky?72 
If you have done nothing other than be in the wrong place at the 
wrong time, these same prosecutors can impose extraordinary 
expenses on you. Twenty-nine current and former White House 
employees went before the Washington grand jury in the Clinton 
investigation, and some have substantial legal bills as a result.73 It is 
true that some of these people may have committed felonies, and so, 
as Judge Posner writes, “we needn’t wring our hands over their 
incurring legal expenses.”74 Moreover, those who were not targets of 
the independent counsel’s investigation ostensibly had no reason to 
hire lawyers.75 On the other hand, can we truly fault those who were 
genuinely frightened and rightfully awed by prosecutorial power and 
sought to minimize the risk of inflicting grave damage upon their 
reputations and careers? 
Independent counsel Donald Smaltz commented about the 
acquittal of former Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy on all 
thirty corruption charges after a $17 million dollar, four-year 
investigation: “[T]he actual indictment of a public official may in fact 
be as great a deterrent as a conviction of that official.”76 Mr. Smaltz is 
correct. If a U.S. attorney decided to go after you tomorrow, for 
whatever alleged offense, he could impose extraordinary expenses on 
you, and if you were acquitted in court, you would still have lost 
because the government would not reimburse you for your legal 
defense. For that matter, under the American rule, if I was sued 
 
 70. POSNER, supra  note 63, at 69. See also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Must a Parent Testify, 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1998, at 33 (opining that Starr’s tactics were not outside the bounds of 
common prosecutorial practice). 
 71. POSNER, supra  note 63, at 76. 
 72. Lewis, supra  note 68. 
 73. Caught in the Web, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1998, at 34. 
 74. POSNER, supra  note 63, at 72. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Skolnik, supra  note 66. 
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tomorrow in a civil case and won, the losing party ordinarily would 
be under no obligation to reimburse my expenses. This is why 
corporations and institutions, such as universities, settle so many 
lawsuits. In other words, it is often cheaper to pay the plaintiff than to 
pay for your own lawyers. If I had the authority to make one change 
in the American legal system, I would introduce the British rule of 
cost shifting, despite the frequently made point that such a rule might 
deter and starve a great many worthy suits.77 Yes, there is a price to 
pay. European countries consider the “loser pays” rule a basic 
requirement of justice and fairness. The poor are aided by legal 
services to litigate their claims and by other protections. 
To address a different problem set, I shall analyze the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970.78 The issue is an 
old one. A statute is enacted for a limited purpose, but its vagueness 
permits innovative lawyers to push the limits of its application. It is 
difficult to believe that various federal courts of appeals had to decide 
that RICO claims cannot be brought against the federal government,79 
and that the question of whether the Internal Revenue Service is a 
racketeering enterprise cannot be answered because of sovereign 
immunity.80 
According to its statement of findings and purposes,81 RICO was 
meant to provide more effective ways of fighting organized crime, 
including requiring the payment of treble damages for private 
attorneys general.82 Instead, as Chief Justice Rehnquist states, “[m]ost 
of the civil suits filed under the statute have nothing to do with 
 
 77. Kathleen Sullivan, Speech at The Commonwealth Club of California (June 9, 1999) in 
The Good That Lawyers Do, T HE COMMONWEALTH  (The Commonwealth Club of California, 
San Francisco, Ca.), Aug. 23, 1999, at 2-5. 
 78.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). 
 79. See McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1993); Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 
393 (6th Cir. 1991), on remand 771 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (on remand, the district 
court was ordered to hold a hearing as to whether Rule 11 sanctions should be applied in a case 
involving Section 1962(d) claims against the federal government), cited in  T HE HON. JED S. 
RAKOFF AND HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY 1-19 
(1999). 
 80. See Chow v. Giordano, No. 93-56162, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11048 (9th Cir. May 
16, 1994), cited in  RAKOFF & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 79, at 1-19. 
 81. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 
(1970). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994). 
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organized crime. They are garden-variety civil fraud cases of the type 
traditionally litigated in state courts.”83 I might add that the Supreme 
Court has not exactly distinguished itself in reining in expansive 
readings of RICO. The statute has been made applicable to mailing 
fraudulent tax returns, to burglaries in two states by non-organized 
crime defendants and even to claims against abortion protesters.84 
RICO has given rise to yet another litigation racket. 
However, my main concern is what the vagueness of the statute 
says about our legal culture. A defendant violates RICO by 
participating in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of 
racketeering.85 Any entity can be an “enterprise” for RICO purposes 
and a “pattern” is fairly easily established by showing at least two 
crimes or a conspiracy to commit at least two crimes.86 The most 
disconcerting aspect of RICO is that the application of its special 
conspiracy provision further attenuates the already loose common 
law concept of conspiracy and stretches the concept to new extremes. 
To be liable under RICO, the conspirator-to-racketeer does not need 
to personally agree to commit a crime. Nor must he have contact with 
or knowledge of other participants in the enterprise, or be able to 
infer their existence by being dependent on their cooperation. 
Incredibly, a defendant may be guilty of conspiracy to violate RICO 
if the government can show, using even circumstantial evidence, that 
he was sufficiently associated with the other crimes of the enterprise 
to have implicitly “agreed” or consented to their commission.87 
 
 83. William H. Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 5, 9 (1989) (originally presented at the Brookings Institution’s Eleventh Seminar 
on the Administration of Justice, Apr. 7, 1989). 
 84. See Illinois Dep’t of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that the state tax agency may maintain a civil RICO action against a retailer who filed 
fraudulent state sales tax returns); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(applying RICO to burglaries in two states by non-organized crime defendants); National Org. 
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (using RICO against abortion protesters); Northeast 
Women’s Cent., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1345 (3d Cir. 1989) (using RICO against 
abortion protesters). 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(C) (1994).  
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)-(5) (1994). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 502 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming 
conviction of RICO conspiracy by using circumstantial evidence of defendants’ association 
with the enterprise’s activities to establish agreement that other patterns of crime occur). See 
also  Jeremy M. Miller, RICO and Conspiracy Construction: The Mischief of the Economic 
Model, 104 COM. L.J.  26, 31 (Spring, 1999).  The author describes:  
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Additionally, his liability extends to all the crimes of the enterprise. 
If this is not “Alice in Wonderland,” what is?88 We call this the rule 
of law? Is this what the war against organized crime justifies? 
Furthermore, the forfeiture provisions of RICO are of a breathtaking 
sweep: The convicted defendant is to forfeit his entire interest in any 
business that is used in some way to facilitate the RICO offense.89 
The ease with which public or private prosecutors may seize upon 
the breadth of the statute is illustrated by the Justice Department’s 
recent RICO suit against tobacco companies. The lawsuit exemplifies 
litigation’s erosion of the rule of law in two respects. First, and more 
mundanely, the federal government is applying RICO far outside the 
context of organized crime in order to accomplish a prohibition that it 
could not muster the political support to legislate. As Robert Bork 
notes, at least when the nation decided to end the “scourge” of 
alcohol, it duly ratified the Eighteenth Amendment.90 
More striking, however, is the government’s breathtaking 
hypocrisy in using a racketeering statute against the tobacco industry, 
when the plaintiff itself could be described as a co-conspirator to the 
harm done. The federal government has long known about the health 
risks associated with smoking; nevertheless, it permitted the sale of 
 
a real and felt concern that RICO’s “enterprise,” combined with conspiracy and the 
RICO (statutory) construction clause . . . had diluted the time-honored, common-law 
principles of actus reus and the limited breadth of inchoate offenses—that is, RICO’s 
liberal construction and “conspiracy to form a criminal enterprise” had perilously 
approached a full-fledged due process violation. 
Id. See also Brian M. Molinari, Conspiracy Theory: The RICO Predicate Act Requirement for 
Wrongful Discharge Cases Brought Under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 481, 493 
(1997) (“A conspiracy to commit the other RICO violations may occur absent the actual 
commission of those violations or the racketeering activities that underpin them . . . [E]ither 
racketeering activity or classic overt conspiracy acts may qualify as “predicate acts” to a RICO 
violation that causes injury.”) (quoting Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1169 
(3d Cir. 1989)); G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: 
Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability 
Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1447 (1996) (“Under the statute, it is irrelevant that 
each defendant participated in the enterprise’s affairs through different, even unrelated crimes, 
so long as we may reasonably infer that each crime was intended to further the enterprise’s 
affairs.”) (quoting United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 902-03 (5th Cir 1978)). 
 88. Memorandum from Robert Weisberg, Stanford Law Professor (on file with author). 
 89. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). 
 90. Robert H. Bork, Tobacco Suit is Latest Abuse of the Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
23, 1999, at A22. 
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tobacco products and profited enormously from taxing such sales. 
The ranks of the racketeers logically include the party who regulated 
and taxed tobacco (or protected it, at the behest of Senators from 
tobacco growing states). It requires extraordinary “chutzpah” to bring 
a RICO suit while mindful of this history. Is this what the war against 
tobacco justifies? 
Let me end my illustrations by providing an example from the life 
of a university president. In 1991, before I became president of 
Stanford, Paul Biddle, the former campus representative for the 
Office of Naval Research, filed a qui tam suit under the so-called 
False Claims Act against the University that alleged overbilling of the 
government.91 In December 1993, more than three and one-half years 
after Biddle had made his first charges, the Justice Department 
declined to enter the lawsuit brought by Biddle. 
In October 1994, Stanford and the U.S. Government agreed to 
settle all disputed matters related to the billing and payment of the 
indirect costs of federally sponsored research at Stanford from 1981 
through 1992. In settling this contractual dispute, the Office of Naval 
Research, the responsible government agency, acknowledged that 
"the Navy has concluded that it does not have a claim that Stanford 
engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or other wrongdoing with 
respect to the Memoranda of Understanding, costs, submissions, 
claims or other matters covered by the settlement agreement.”92 
The settlement required Stanford to pay the government an 
additional $1.2 million as an adjustment for the years 1981 through 
1992 and to dismiss its appeals concerning 1991 and 1992. As a 
normal business settlement, this was unremarkable. Over the course 
of twelve years, Stanford had conducted research under nearly 18,000 
federally sponsored contracts and grants involving hundreds of 
millions of transactions and dollars. Adjustments when closing out 
the books for open years are normal and expected under the 
applicable government rules, and the amount of the adjustments for 
the years settled were within the normal range. 
 
 91.  GERHARD CASPER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY , CARES OF THE UNIVERSITY: FIVE-YEAR 
REPORT TO THE BOARD OF T RUSTEES AND THE ACADEMIC COUNCIL OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY 
37, 37-39 (1999), available at http://www.Stanford.edu/home/standford/cares.  
 92.  Id. 
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This case, however, was not normal. Not one sponsored research 
dispute at any university, including Stanford, has ever received as 
much attention and scrutiny as indirect costs at Stanford. As the 
public controversy developed, the inquiry caused much pain, distress, 
and expense. Between 1991 and 1994, Stanford spent twenty-seven 
million dollars on accountants, auditors and consultants to address 
issues raised by federal government auditors.93 This figure does not 
include legal costs. All of these expenditures had to be paid for with 
funds from unrestricted sources, of which the most important is 
tuition. To the extent that Stanford made errors, such errors were 
wholly regrettable. But the irresponsible accusations against Stanford 
and University officials were also regrettable. To this day, I receive 
letters from alumni who simply assume that the sensational headlines 
they read told the truth and gave a fair picture. 
In our overheated public life, a presumption of innocence is hardly 
ever granted and, since New York Times v. Sullivan, there is no 
protection against defamation of public actors except when false 
statements are made with actual malice.94 The ease with which 
accusations were made against the university, complex accounting 
issues were irresponsibly oversimplified by the media, and vast costs 
were imposed on the University is disheartening to a lawyer because 
the story is in no way unique. It seems that many regulatory disputes 
these days are prejudged by government officials and then tried in 
legislative committees and the media. Audits are treated as if they 
were criminal prosecutions. 
The illustrations that I have offered are from different, but by no 
means all, walks of life. I have not even scratched the surface. There 
are much more basic issues. I said at the beginning that the concept of 
the rule of law requires a basis in law for the exercise of public 
authority. All too often that basis is far-fetched and tenuous. I remind 
you how much regulation (such as the San Francisco example with 
which I began) is based not on statutes passed by state or federal 
legislatures, but rather on the so-called procurement powers of all 
levels of government, from local to federal. 
My examples are not exceptions, but rather symptomatic of a 
 
 93.  Id. 
 94. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
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larger problem. What I have described can and does happen to poor 
people, middle-class people, politicians, businesses and institutions. 
It goes without saying that I am not making the point that all 
policemen, bureaucrats and prosecutors are on the wrong track. Many 
try to do the decent thing under trying circumstances. They must cope 
with a deeply flawed system that makes the thoughtful weighing of 
costs and benefits the exception, rather than the rule. Let me turn to 
some more general observations. 
III 
The many wars, for which law provides the weapons, are often 
characterized by inconsistent and conflicting orders. In our system of 
public administration and adjudication of public  law issues, we suffer 
from too many layers of government with concurrent jurisdiction. 
Preemption is nonexistent in too many areas of law.95 Where just a 
single level of government would busily produce a regulatory maze, 
complex and internally inconsistent enough to employ legions of 
handholding lawyers, we allow two, three, or four to have their say. 
Not only do multiple government agencies have a say, but so do 
innumerable citizens acting as private attorney generals, empowered 
to bring private suits. Government decisionmaking is further distorted 
when enforcement rights, over matters concerning the public interest, 
are granted to private parties, such as in qui tam actions.96 
More generally, lawyers for private parties employ private 
litigation as a bulldozer for the implementation of ill-thought-through 
bureaucratic policy preferences. For instance, EEOC concepts such as 
the vague notion of a “hostile environment,” are increasingly 
 
 95. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 
461 U.S. 190, 191 (1983) (holding that “Congress has preserved the dual regulation of nuclear-
powered electricity generation: the Federal Government maintains complete control of the 
safety and “nuclear” aspects of energy generation . . . the States exercise their traditional 
authority over . . . the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to 
be licensed, land use, ratemaking.”) 
 96. See Sean Hamer, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by the Qui 
Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (1997) (discussing 
constitutional and policy arguments surrounding qui tam actions from the False Claims Act); 
James T. Blanch, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 701 (1993) (same); Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam 
Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (discussing the constitutionality of qui tam actions in general). 
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prominent in Title VII litigation. While this regulatory concept 
undoubtedly has some legitimacy, its role as the decisive criterion in 
discrimination cases and its inherent vagueness subject employers to 
the real fear that almost anything could create a hostile work 
environment. This “enlightened” concept leads to both chilling life 
and engendering unpredictability—a bad combination. 
The mixing of administrative and criminal law approaches leads 
to legal overreach by blurring any distinction between auditing and 
prosecuting. Furthermore, the excessive use of administratively 
imposed sanctions, that are often very substantial, gives the 
enforcement of administrative law a quasi-criminal character and 
insulates low-level decision-makers from the oversight of their 
hierarchical superiors. The bureaucrats’ tyranny persists because 
higher-ups do not want to be seen as interfering with “enforcement 
actions.” 
Ironically, hierarchical control also breaks down for the opposite 
reason—the politicization of public administration. Think of the 
influence of congressional staffers, representing a powerful 
committee chair, on mid-level executive branch activities. Much of 
the time our government, where in Paine’s words, the law is king, 
does not act by majority rule. Our system of checks and balances has 
become so extreme and byzantine that political accountability is 
difficult to obtain. The most important measure of a democracy is 
whether you can “throw the rascals out.” In order to do that you need 
to know who the rascals are, and we voters often have no clue. 
Finally, the fact is that we have no efficient and cheap recourse for 
those who suffer at the hands of public authority. Indeed, our judicial 
process is neither timely nor affordable for most people. We have an 
independent judiciary, but that judiciary feels little responsibility for 
systemic excesses. During a recent three-month period, 10% of my 
regular working hours were spent in depositions, preparation for 
depositions and review of deposition transcripts for a single lawsuit 
over tenure. All of the underlying events took place in 1988, four 
years before I even arrived at Stanford. The case was in state court, 
and California procedure allows depositions as a means for obtaining 
evidence, which amounts to the contemporary equivalent of torture. 
As I said, in Britain and on the European continent, cost shifting 
to the losing party is considered a fundamental requirement of justice. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/6
p149 Casper.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Rule of Law or Enlightened Absolutism 171 
 
 
The absence of cost shifting in the United States leaves many of us 
with the unhappy choice between ruining ourselves in vindicating our 
rights or paying off a plaintiff because spending inordinate amounts 
of money on lawyers seems a poor use of resources, especially if the 
resources are those of a philanthropic institution, such as a university. 
Overall, legal costs are staggering, and the only explanation I can see 
for why we have not yet broken down under them is the fact that we 
are a prosperous country accustomed to so much waste. 
IV 
What do I really think? Since the eighteenth century we have seen 
extraordinary growth in personal freedom, formal and substantive 
equality, and societal and, in many instances, personal wealth. While 
welfare systems have not succeeded in eliminating poverty, they at 
least represent an acknowledgment of the obligation to moderate 
poverty. Apart from poverty, stark differences between the haves and 
the have-nots remain. Indeed, in the United States, such differences 
are unfortunately on the increase. Yet, at least equality of 
opportunity, not infrequently, is more than a mere aspiration. 
When I say “personal freedom,” I, of course, mean political 
freedom, as found in the protection given to the freedom of speech or 
the enforcement of voting rights. However, I also refer to the freedom 
to fashion your life, to choose the people with whom you want to 
spend your life, and personal mobility. By comparison not only to 
eighteenth century Prussia but also to eighteenth-century 
Massachusetts or Virginia, no personal status limits the freedom to 
develop one’s personality. The commodification of life seems to 
favor much shallowness and disconnectedness, but questions 
concerning the quality of life are rather complex and answers are too 
easily marked by prejudice. 
If there is so much to admire, why am I somber? I have suggested 
some of the reasons through the illustrations and conclusions I 
provided earlier. The question that constitutes my title poses the rule 
of law and enlightened absolutism as alternatives. In reality, we have 
them both, not as parallel phenomena, but as an unholy alliance 
where the law becomes the often contradictory, creeping, 
undisciplined, chaotic and definitely expensive means for the 
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implementation of absolutist visions of the world. 
Ideologies are not dead. All-embracing ones have, for the time 
being, become a rarity. Ideological politics, however, are still very 
much alive. In the legal system, they find their expression through the 
ideological law firms of the left or right, mostly masquerading as 
“foundations.” Edward Shils defined ideological politics as based on 
the assumption “that politics should be conducted from the standpoint 
of a coherent, comprehensive set of beliefs which must override 
every other consideration.”97 If we omit the attributes “coherent” and 
“comprehensive,” the definition can still serve to capture what in the 
vernacular has come to be called “single-issue politics.” Frequently, 
non-interest-group politics allow for political compromise and belief-
driven politics that override every other consideration. Unfortunately, 
compromise is viewed as a compromise with evil and sin, and 
therefore, is unacceptable.98 
In the United States, the organizational skills of belief-driven 
politics often result in politicians providing immediate satisfaction to 
sectional ends99 through the passing of mostly vague and ill-thought 
through laws with complete disregard for the systemic consequences. 
In some states, such as California, we have the added problem of an 
increasingly populist electorate that has abandoned a basic 
commitment to representative government and, instead, rules by 
referenda. A multitude of causes with “zero tolerance” for this, that, 
or something else, have captured law for their ends, not allowing for 
discretion, common sense, balancing, proportionality or judgment. 
“Enlightened absolutism” is not dead, it has simply become 
pluralistic. 
Though I do believe that my profession, the legal profession, 
including the law schools, has been woefully unmindful of the 
systemic consequences of what legislatures, administrations, courts 
and lawyers are doing, and that a call for careful and thorough 
reengineering of the legal system is overdue, it is also the case that 
our political system has encouraged absolutism, including pluralistic 
absolutism, to capture the law. Frederick II of Prussia may have 
 
 97. SHILS, supra  note 1, at 25-26. 
 98. Id. at 52. 
 99. See id. at 51. 
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believed that reason can prescribe virtue, however, in that respect, a 
democratic pluralistic polity cannot be self-confident. 
Let me conclude by quoting the same author with whom I began, 
Edward Shils: “Above all, civil politics require an understanding of 
the complexity of virtue, that no virtue stands alone, that every 
virtuous act costs something in terms of other virtuous acts, that 
virtues are intertwined with evils, and that no theoretical system of a 
hierarchy of virtues is ever realizable in practice.”100 If our politics do 
not become more modest, more responsible and more understanding 
of the costs of virtuous policies in terms of other virtuous policies, 
then our legal system will continue to grow more expensive, more 
unruly and more despotic. 
 
 100. Id. at 52. 
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